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ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWERS 
Section 
1. (Three depar tments of government.] 
Section 1. (Tlirce dcpnrtrnentf i of gove rnmen t . ) 
The powers of the government of the Sta te of Utah 
shnll he divided into three distinct departments , the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial : a n j n 
Person chnrped with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or per-
mitted1. __ ~ '«- ' 
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0 76-5-301. K i d n a p i n g . 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he inten-
tionally or knowingly and without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim: 
(a) Detains or restrains another for any sub-
stantial period; or 
(b) Detains or restrains another in circum-
stances exposing him to risk of serious bodily in-
jury; or 
(c) Holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) Detains or restrains a minor without con-
sent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 1983 
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pairing contracts.] 
No bfll of attainder, ex post facto law, or law \r*T 
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S e c l(fc—fPtfwera denied the states.] 
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or confederation; grant letters of marque and repri-
sal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing 
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; 
pass any bill of attainder, ^ nf«fc facto jaw? or law 
impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any 
title of nobility. 
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Ex-
ports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of 
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports 
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the 
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to 
the Revision and Control of the Congress. 
[3.) No State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships 
of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, 
or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger asxjriil not admit of delay. 
S Widm$<(£&ttfo (flmtyi/fflrmf'. 
AMENDMENT XTV 
I I 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforre any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of lTe, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person .i.hin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws* 
Mfifttttfkti 
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Sccooa 7. (Dmc process at hiw.| 
No person shail be ocpiivcir-of life, liberty °' 
prppcrty, witnout due process of law, — . . : : " it? 
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Sec. 11. (Court* open — Redress of injuries.! 
\ All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law. which 
shall he administered without denini or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from orosecutm^ 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. »••• 
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.l 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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fense charred aeaxnst him is proved bevond a reason-
nhif cnuoT.. In nosence oi" such proof, the defendant 
shall be ccauntca . 
;_-. '.2) As usee m this part the words "element of the 
oiiensc rrjvan: 
uni The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
rrr.uit.s of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bicidrn m the definition, of the ofTcrme: 
(hi The cuioabie mentai suaus required. 
(3i The existence of jurisdiction and v«?nuc are not 
elements oi the offense r>u: snaii be established by a 
preponderance of tne evioence. l i m 
KIDNAPING 
76-5-301. Kidnaping. 
( D A person commits kidnaping when he inten-
tionally or knowingly and without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim: 
(a) Detains or restrains another for any sub-
stantial period; or 
(b) Detains or restrains another in circum-
stances exposing him to risk of serious bodily in-
jury; or 
(c) Holds another in ^voluntary servitude; or 
(d) Detains or r& - a minor without con-
sent of its paren' guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a i my of the second degree. 1983 
-mfcszaa-putt?^ 
4 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
( D A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, 
or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or rewara, or as a shield 
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage 
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 
in particular conduct; or 
(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or at-
tempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another: or 
(d) To interfere wifh t^e pprfnrmpm^P of any 
governmental or political function; or 
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in 
Part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the re-
sult of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally 
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the ef-
fective consent of the victims custodial parent, 
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the vic-
tim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first 
degree punishable by a term which is a minimum 
mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years 
and which may be for life. 1983 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction^ of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
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Section 
1. (Three depot tmctils of government.) 
» 
Section 1. (Three dcpnrtmcnLi of fjovcrnmcnl.I 
The powcrn of the government of Die Stnie of Ulnh 
shnll bo divided into three distinct departments, the 
I^egislntive, the Executive, mid tho Judicial; and ntt 
' person chnrped with the exercise of powcra propgrly 
bcionyrinft To one o( these dcpnxtmnnls. ghoil exercise 
niiy Junctions Appertaining to cither of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed o' ocf* 
mitted. ia|f 
t-*?--4mtfaia()'*&"*£ i^['z$/#$- W* ^  ^^-&- ) 
i§^/,fc^ 
„ .^i^^^^dtoiA^^Ai^ 
_  mrnhMmm^ ~ 
affi&aEfclv 1 
<!^fytiB^4^ 
£-*+- ***>MMrf*r*in*P-Jrbk r^sfc/fiflZ-jUttiM. SM£Z?-m 
„.sri£3fiffl.dk ra&iMt ddfefifa s/kmif* 
4tttiuomMui&'&A 
jMfautfatjfatmMflMfoii ML 
JIMSM /Sm^iaL alto, nuib/b 
U P*_-Ato01ks6jrj4rfi# / ^ \CJffi//rM-MAPWL Stossr-M- ~ T 
& *£Mwffl mb/akur'' &m£fik *f: 
%<A,iS'jfeMit\<fjfi>'f „ 
.—1 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping, **j "<C 
(1)A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
— - of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, 
or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield 
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage 
^ in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 
in particular conduct; or 
(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted 
~~ — commission, or flight after commission or at-
tempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another; or 
(d) To interfere with the performance of any 
_._.._. governmental or political function; or 
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in 
Part 4 of this chapter. 
—— • (2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the re-
sult of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally 
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the ef-
fective consent of the victim's custodial parent, 
^ guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the vic-
tim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first 
degree punishable by a term which is a minimu^ 
mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15, years 
and which may be for life. — *""— — - "'j, 
l> 
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S.B. 287 
Passed 3/1/95, (Governor did not sign.) 
Effective 5 /1 /95 
Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 337 
Amendments to Sentencing Provisions 
Sponsor: Lane Beattie 
AN ACT Relating to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure; Requiring the Court to Consider 
Home Confinement As a Condition of 
Probation; Requiring the Department of 
Corrections to Establish Procedures and 
Standards for Home Confinement and 
Elec tronic M o n i t o r i n g ; P r o v i d i n g 
Exemptions; Amending Sentencing 
Provisions On Sexual Offenses Against 
Children and Related Offenses; Amending 
Related Provisions On Probation and 
Parole; and Making Technical Changes. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
76-3-201, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws 
of Utah 1994 
76-3-406, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws 
of Utah 1994 
76-5-301.1, as last amended by Chapter 18, Laws 
of Utah 1984 
76-5-302, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws 
t_pJJMU283 — 
76-5-402.1, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of 
Utah 1983 
76-5-402.3, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of 
Utah 1983 
76-5-403.1, as last amended by Chapter 156, 
Laws of Utah 1988 
76-5-404.1, as last amended by Chapter 170, 
Laws of Utah 1989 TS. 
76-5-405, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws 
of Utah 1989 
76-5-406.5, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws 
of Utah 1994 
77-18-1, as last amended by Chapters 13, 198, 
and 230, Laws of Utah 1994 
77-27-9, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws of 
Utah 1994 - • - ; - -:•-
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 76-3-201 is amended to read: 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences 
allowed • Civil penalties - Restitution - . ^ „ 
Hearing - Definitions - Resentencing • ~ " 
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with 
mandatory sentences. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
admission of committing the criminal "without an 
conduct 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including 
earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including insured damages, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as 
a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant 
in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a 
court may sentence a person adjudged guilty of an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public 
or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; .: 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison 
without parole; or 
(g) on or after May 1, 1995, to imprisonment at 
not less than 5 years and which may be for life for 
an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and 
Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or 
1(8)1 (h) to death. ^a* 
(3) (a) This chapter doeV not deprive a court of 
authority conferred by law to: ru(*> 
(i) forfeit property; >: r-. rn«-;; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; ; s i :~ ;j 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; . ^ 
(iv) permit removal of a person from of flee; 
(v) cite for contempt; or -• r .:. A j , rv T-T«VA 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. .:s -•-. .;.-;. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution 
up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to 
the victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of 
any other criminal conduct admitted by the 
defendant to the sentencing court. T^UT-J 
(i i) In determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). - - S L I ^ .LS -. J: ;: •-••-.:-.r:U 
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to 
this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, t o 
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of 
criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant 
make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). _ ~ . . . . . . 
(c) In determining whether or not to order 
restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial, JOT 
'«<TA tfy."fUtUlk 
• \ 
i 
i— 
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;*-*> S.B. 26 W l 
Passed 2/8/96, Approved 2/23/% 
Effective d_;Q.Q* «*-«< 
Laws of Utah 1996, Chapter 40 
Criminal Penalty Adjustments 
Sponsor: LyjeJ^HiUyjril, Craig L. Taylor, Mike 
Dmitrich, Robert F. Montgomery, Robert C. 
Steiner, L. Alma Mansell, Eldon A. Money, Lane 
Beattie, Craig A. Peterson, Scott N. Howell, Millie 
M. Peterson, Alarik Myrin, Stephen J. Rees, 
Charles H. Stewart, Wilford R. Black Jr, David L. 
Watson, David H. Steele, Leonard M. Blackham 
An Act Relating to the Criminal Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure; Amending 
Sentencing Provisions On Aggravated 
Murder, Murder, and Sexual Offenses 
Against Children; Making Nonmandatory 
the Minimum Sentences; Providing for 
Mandatory Imprisonment; Amending 
Related Provisions On Probation and 
Parole; and Making Technical Changes. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended 
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special 
Session 
76-3-406 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended 
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special 
Session 
76-4-102, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws 
of Utah 1983 
76-4-202, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws 
of Utah 1983 
76-5-301.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
Special Session 
76-5-302 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended 
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special 
Session 
76-5-402.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
Special Session 
76-5-402.3 (Effective 04/29/96), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
Special Session 
76-5-403.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
Special Session 
76-5-404.1 (Effective 04/29/96), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
Special Session 
76-5-405 (Effective 04/29/96), as last amended 
by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First Special 
Session 
76-5-406.5 (Effective 04/29/%), as last 
amended by Chapter 10, Laws of Utah 1995, First 
REPEALS: 
76-3-201.3, as enacted by Chapter 10, Laws of 
Utah 1995, First Special Session 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/ 
96) is amended to read: 
76-3-201 (Effective 04/29/96). Sentences or 
combination of sentences allowed - Civil 
penalties - Restitution - Hearing - Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) " Conviction * includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including 
rankings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Subsection 
(4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as 
a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant 
in the defendant's criminal activities. 
p i y i t h i n the limit* prescribed by this chaptcrT a 
court may sentence a person convicted of an offense 
to any one of the' following sentences^ or 
combination of th e m ! 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public 
or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(0 on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison 
without parole; or •*-.*• * 
[(g) on or after Apn1 29, 1996, to imprisonment 
at not less than five years and which may} [be for 
life for an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, 
and Sections 76 5 30LI and 76-5-302; 1 fori 
[(b)] (g) to death. ^ 7 5 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of 
authority conferred by law to: 
W-
^ ^ — - A- A - A/T^AJ^U^ *r A*f* IP \J*M- Mt$ lb* $£a£2Z=££r} 
MIL %l /tmh&ry 1SLS£ rife, ft(Mft/fat ^ J2L B &2B&&L£_ 
UNDER ROE V. LUNffiTROM. 89' UTAH at 525* 
It' the ordinance fails to fix a penalty 
fjjr its violation^ it is unenforceable. This principle is aptly 
stated in the case of Moorehouse v. Hammond,, 60 Utah 593, 
209 P. 883,885: — ~ — — « — — 
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses, except such as are 
created by statute or ordinance, and a_court is powerless to impose a -4^rT 
penalty not prescribed_by - -*-*--*- -- - - --J* - - J L - ^ 
siatutel^ofmnance makini 
a statute or an ordinance: and hence a 
i g it a crime or offense to do a certain act, 
without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inoperative, f ^d { 
and incapable ot being given any Effect by "the courts." ~A 
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Moorehouse T. Hammond, 60 Utah 693 +< 
. ' • • • • ' ! 
'1 *'A description or doflnitlon of an act necessary to constitute A 
erlmo docs not make the commission oC such acts & crime, unless 
there is a punishment- annexed. Punishment is aa necessary to 
constitute a crime as definition. • # ••• 
It W&3 accordingly held in that case that a statute which 
does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same ques-
tion was before the sumc court again in Matter of Ellsworth, 
, 165 Cal 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to 
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in ques-
tion. The ordinance in (hat case, as in the case ot bar, failed 
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it 
rtaa again held that the ordinance was without force or effect 
4~C 
utf- J/nh. * T^fi^ A** *k 9to*M-&-J 
|In New Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. G52, G9 South. 43, thc^ dc^  
fondant was convicted of violating the provisions of a ecrtuin 
.ordinance relating to the public health. The defendant lap. 
poaled from the conviction, contending that, in view thattho 
ordinance under wliich he was couvicted failed to impose a 
penalty or punishment, the sentence imposed by the court 
was illegal and void. The court sustained the contention. 
,The law is clearly stated in the hcadnotc as follows: fj 
"There aro hi this state no crimes or offenses except such us are 
created by statuto or ordinance, and^court la powerless to Imuoae 
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hcncV A 
statute or ordinance making It a crime or offense to do a czrthin 
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing of such nct^  U i r W • 
^era^lve, and Incapable ot bejog given any effect by too courts." -
The same question was before the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida in the case of Cribb v. State, 9 Fla., where, at page 418, 
after referring to the statute under which the conviction was 
had, tlio court said: 
"But the difficulty of sustaining: the conviction and Judgment 
under this count Is that, although it [the statute] enjoins or forbids 
the resident from holding the license, no penalty or remedy by in-
dictment is prescribed. • • • The statute that creates the of-
fonse has not. proscribed the penalty." 
It was accordingly held that the judgment of eouvictiou 
was illegal. It is not necessary to pursue the question or the 
authorities further. It must be manifest to every lawyer that 
crimes can only be created by the Legislature or by its express 
authority, and that, unless a criminal-statute or ordinance 
• 
prescribes a penalty for its violation, the courts are power-
less to enforce the same. The judgment of the justice's court, 
which was produced in evidence at the hearing before the de-
fendant and the committee of physicians, was therefore with-
out force or effect, and the recommendation or report of the 
physicians to the defendant,.being based thereon, was like-
wise without any legal force or effect. In view, therefore, 
^-4fc0(ld?mt?])-Mk /mdatf- dUfi to Bfa&l-M. J 
•PIT* m ,, j/m^/M tffl£r//M/r ,%!$$£ &M/t "x$>*"< 4? //J> *a**t£ /?/ 
mafM M&& MM&&te£ ^''iryM/rA jkJfi^k " ?frz2 f^egg dfe Mm 
'ft/mnif-///*<$. 
totiM* i*i S^j ff^Kf 
^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
'.tttLfppi 
^tCrL&toM/imte&fifc?- JM*. Y.-jjfaty-MASPr-i*- ) 
/ . / . * 
• jurisdiction cannot l>c waived and juri 
linn cannot be conferred U|KIII a * 
Uck oT 
isdic-
court by consent, inaction or stipulation., 
'(jaBTorttia v. ZaRuc. 4<3 U JL.109. 93 S.CL 
'390, zCL.Ed2±MZ(ffl2); Malta v. Ilogan, 
-' 392 FJ&TC8G (lOUi Cir. 19C8k-If « « paK 
Iks do not raise the question of lack of 
- jurisdiction, it is the duty of U«c federal 
court tojiclcnninc tlw waller sua stnnlc -• 
-> "ffiSo V. Utoh-JJoivaya^ JJghl Compaqr, ' 
495 F.2d900^909 flQth Cir."l9?4^ A court 
_ jacking jurisdiction cannot rentier judgment 
but must dismiss the cause at *ny stage ml 
Ac proceedings iii which, jtjwxomcs appar-
ent tint jurisdiction is lacking. Mitchell r. . 
*«55G.?»3 U5.237, 55.S.XX 1C2,7? LJJdT 
~ .T»(TO4): 
Jjkmmki 
U 1&imfal/"A^^ ''Jrt/*mff/>$fi*?/rA'<MrA of 
'^u^^mJihi&JB^t. x/MAM/fo& /IMP* 
1 \mtiMnM 7?&r'*{VMA/MM£-A t,d,ti <&QOAMAM/- ^ / A ^ ^ V / V / = > 
j g g t i ^ 
ffl%r>tyfSff>j'i mitkwkBt < f ^ * * N | £z z&rsmn wfvJMfitia 
\fSj^/^^ 49 f(W*tfx4fa7 tfddt __.__ 
S e c 18. {At6sunder—-Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] .. 
No bill of attainder, eg post facto law, or law I D ? 
pairing the^obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
0 0 0 
0* 
^*j-Afy{0Mitit'*r <&mef-Mtk K l&Atl-****. tfpft <%f ff_ } 
• Qrnhm 
ts^MLi: ARTICLE VI 
LEGISLATIVE 
DEPARTMENT 
Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House anii-* 
People.] 
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested: 
*;; *» * Senate and House of Representatives whffi 
shah, oe designated the Legislature of the StateoT 
*TTIn the people of the State >n Utah, as hereinafter 
stated: 
i£t 
Section 4. Section 76-5-302 is amended* to read: 
s a shield 
ngage in 
paging in 
tempted 
.aicinpted 
ri/c the 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping 
(i) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, 
or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or ; 
or hostage, or to compel a third person i-
particular conduct or to forbear from ? 
particular conduct; or •4-4. 
(b) to facilitate the commission, 
commission, or flight after commifsion ot 
commission of a felony; or +*£ 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on cr to «c 
victim or another; or ^K> 
(d) to interfere with the performative «»f any 
governmental or political function: o r / t ^ 
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in 
Part 4 of this chapter. - — 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the 
result of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is 
mentally incompetent or younger than [sixteen] £6 
years and the detention or moving is accomplished 
without the effective consent of the victim's 
custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco 
parentis to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first 
degree punishable on__or_after May !_, 1995, by (a) 
ai!_JHde^cniunate term (which--is—a—minimum 
mandatory-term] of imprisonment |of Sy-4Qr-ef-44 
years and which may be for| at not less than 5 years 
u.^sfc. 
jmS/&,^^^ jL £ i^Msmd- gJi&lbummL 
¥&/tf-Afc*3&J9//-M&titt SMSxz-oi- ) 
S^Mmrfh)'flmmthzi ^r^-sizuxu^&Mk 
i * 
•INSTRUCTION NO. 
. i 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1) Said defendant, David Darnell Tindall 
2) 
3) 
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim (V. Campbell), 
by any means and in any manner, seized, confined, 
detained or transported a person (V. Campbell) with 
intent: ' * 
to facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission or flight after commission 
or attempted commission of a felony 
and/or 
b) to inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize a person (V. Campbell) 
and/or -4h^ 
to hold as a shield or hostage or tflo 
compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct .. 
aasLlax- 4rt 
d) to interfere with performance of 
governmental or political function 
any 
(-vfr-A(flllti*i* /ftAjl- Afe * T^/nfL tolfi Mi Mom*tf-
~?r 
it 
j 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, J.t^is your duty to convict the defendant of aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree' felony.,, LJfflJP/lt 
J ^ ^ i z ^ 2 ^ ^ M ^ 4 m z ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^^J^egaM.£mdj^^ki 
&Mfihm> 
ff -* <& P 0 r\ /• A ^ / /X2JL 
9 
*&^&£g~'±-*£&. 
^fmtfMnx. tfjiMkMirrMfiti r ^ ^Uwf^M.t __ 
ARTICL; SJU // 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
. POWERS 
Section 
1. (Three deportments of government.I 
Section 1. [Three depnrtments of government,! 
The powern of the government of the Slntc of Ulnh 
shnll ho divided into three distinct deportments, the 
legislative, the Executive, nnd the Judicial; on^juj^ 
prison clmfgcd with the exercise ofpowcrs properly/ 
beion^inrr <o oiic o£ these departments, ajiaiM!xercis_e 
nny junctions nppcrtnTtTmyTocTtltc^T^TTT^^rricr^ 
Txcrv^i^^cSsSTTTSfcnS^S o' per-CXCCfl 
mittcd. 
mitted. 
jf^dfifiMu^ 
(-X4 r-MMMtti^Jtofy^fl^ SM&T-M- ) 
• i 
And. A conjunction connecting words or phrases ex-
pressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or 
taken along with the first. Added to; together with; 
joined with; as well as; including. Sometimes con-
strued as "or." Land & Lake Ass'n v. Conklin, 182 A.D. 
546, 170 N.Y.S. 427, 428. 
It expresses a general relation or connection, a partic-
ipation or accompaniment in sequence, having no inher-
ent meaning standing alone but deriving force from 
what comes before and after. In its conjunctive sense 
the word is used to conjoin words, clauses, or sentences, 
expressing the relation of addition or connection, and 
signifying that something is to follow in addition to that 
which proceeds and its use implies that the connected 
elements must be grammatically co-ordinate, as where 
the elements preceding and succeeding the use of the 
words refer to the same subject matter. While it is said 
that there is no exact synonym of the word in English, it 
has been defined to mean "along with", "also", "and 
also", "as well as", besides", "together with". Oliver v. 
Oliver, 286 Ky. 6, 149 S.W.2d 540, 542. 
j f r j ^ n d / o r " means either or both of. Poucher v. State, 
287 Ala. 731, 240 So.2d 695, 695. When expression 
"and/or" is used, that word may be taken as will best 
effect the purpose of the parties as gathered from the 
contract taken as a whole, or, in other words, as wilL, 
best accord wjth the equjtv of the situation. Bobrow v. 
U. S. Casualty C5T231 A.D. 91, 246 N.Y.S. 363, 367. 
~ Or* n, 
called 
A term used in heraldry, and signifying gold; 
sol" by some heralds when it occurs in the arms 
of princes, and "topaz" or "carbuncle" when borne by 
peers. Engravers represent it by an indefinite number 
of small points. 
Or, conj. A disjunctive particle used to express an alter- J 
native or to give a choice of one among two or morel 
things. It is also used to clarify what has already been 
said, and in such cases, means "in other words," "to-
wit," or "that is to say." The word "or" is to be used as 
a function word to indicate an alternative between dif-
ferent or unlike things. City of Toledo v. Lucas County 
Budget Commission, 33 Ohio St.2d 62, 294 N.E.2d 661, 
663. In some usages, the word "or" creates a multiple 
rather than an alternative obligation; where necessary 
in interpreting an instrument, "or" may be construed to 
maan "and." Atchison v. City of Englewood, Colo., 568 f. 
P.2d 13, 18. 
L 
jffliJL,5&&Mfr^*^***" « # ,mdA®ia .(^tmi^JkjmiaL -
W$Mff '"("^Sifc &r*f*'jrffa do ^ **&*»**£ M&M A1X — 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
_7fi-l«501. Presumption of iru>octnce — "Ele-
ment oTihe o'fTcnseTiLnind ». 
. (1) A defendant in a criminal procecdinc is pre-
>Mm*TlfiJag HP^g"'- until each clement of the of-
fense charged against him »s proved brvond a reason' 
• bjt doubt. In absence 01 such proof, the defendant 
thai! D* a c q u i t ^ 
.r^z. (?' Ai used in this pan the words "element of the 
ofJenaa" mean: 
lai The conduct, attendant eircumsLances. or 
result* of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definiuontof the oflenae; 
(bi The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. II7J 
$Mh/^ 
_ _ „ ^<^J^ 
tf/i/m^l^ "-afaLsr^P MAX.) to£/d/r/tl ' 
KIDNAPING 
76-5-301. Kidnaping. 
( D A person commits kidnaping when he inten-
tionally or knowingly and without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim: 
(a) Detains or restrains another for any sub-
stantial period; or 
(b) Detains or restrains another in circum-
stances exposing him to risk of serious bodily in-
jury; or 
(c) Holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d> Detains or restrains a minor without con-
sent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 1983 
(-^-^MoM********''*?-- ofafe * TSfc/fifft- m* #A. SiMMM- / 
J ! pi&&i&mtf w&&fc£): 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. M~4 
il) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law and against the wiil of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, 
or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield 
oriiostage. or to compei a third person to engage 
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 
in particular conduct: or 
i£^To facilitate the"Tommission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or at-
tempted commission of a feiony; or 
ifi^To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another: or 
^d) To interfere with the performance of any 
governmental or political function: or 
(fr* Tn commit a sexuai offense as described in 
Part 4 of this chaoter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the re-
suit of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally 
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the ef-
fective consent of the victim's custodial parent, 
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the vic-
tim. 
//j//7W/>JjffAf'/jAw &46BBBg$j&S/!ei£'* rJf?r*rFiR ?&%£££' 
mwMjjtL £tmd>*!u&^£-ad^fafa 
m.fLi#.(L*. ^AMMM* 
TM7-1, i. MM lo defree • Convicted only on"» . 
* lowest. . . • - ; : . • . , . -. 
• •. When it appeart the* defendant has committed a . 
public'offense and there is reasonable* doubt as to': 
which, of jwo or more decrees he.i* guilty ..jhejrtjgjM 
c
 be convicted only of the lower degreg./ im 
'&L 
j«»- IssS.J 0(;i)K.v V,VVY 
'faiff£ifai2& 
M C L A I G H I . I X . 
j 
389 
JpilinU'd without a law nutjiorj^ngjtj JUuT.l^cJi Ja^Tmiat 
JJRjdl^^^yiT.i^.^ai . . , .^'0 c l° not think'That tho'scctionB"" 
referred to gave "the plaintiff power to punish tho defend-
ants fur the ofTensd charged against them. Tho order of 
the distri.it court, therefore, sustaining i} iC demurrer, was .. 
j-.roper. ' * 
The order* and judgment of the district court are af-
firmed. I } I 
Arranging for the distribution of h coo-
 ; 
trolled substance. • 
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and 
specifically sanctions the offense of arranging 
for the distribution of a control led.subntance; 
therefore, pursuant to §§ 58-37-lJ and 
76-1-103, defendant was required to be ckargcd_ 
with such otlense under § 58-37-8(l)(aXiv) oT 
the Controlled Substances Act, and it was error'"' 
barge him under this section. Si ate v. 
« . 659. y.U 1038 fUuk 1563>; : " 
h Mtk^Mfj i&f. BdAZO QMiBS^ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Timmy HILL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19275. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 26, 1984. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, John F. 
Walhquist, J., of theft by deception and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that defendant should have been 
charged with distribution of an imitation 
controlled substance. 
Reversed. 
QrzR-^fiiU^£<su^(Ak ^TmloM-m^ nL 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent* 
v, 
Leonard SCOTT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860284. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 15, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted in the Sixth 
District Court, Sevier County, Louis G. Ter-
vort, J., of distribution of controlled sub-
stance for value, and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that defendant, who 
was alleged to have committed acts within 
coverage of offense of arranging to distrib-
ute controlled substance, could not be 
charged with aiding and abetting another 
in distribution of controlled substance. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial, 
fail ikmjm /TM/fih atfajw2£ i^^m0^^iiMmi 
z&BL 
// .* 
.s (tiMfttflfc = 
_&mULw$/ii^ 
f (f- *£MrJAM0fatofueMr*P- Jfnfc V^//a0^ Mte*m. $U>5$7-M- ) 
ih/m idijMfe ^ M&^JS^^M SL e$$M£, q£ 
MM. msLbf A&/&L gfe TZthi &y^%mti6AteH4k 
ml. 
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**4<T tcWsmneT> *« fr'/ov/jr^ 
Article I, section 24- of the Utah Constitu-
tion statesJ^All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." The principle that 
"persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circum-
stances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same," Malan v. 
Leuris, 693 P.2d 661, 699 (Utah 1984), is so-
fundamental to Utah law that Article I, sec-
tion 2 of the Utah Constitution declares that 
an integral purpose of a free government is 
to ensure the equal protection of the law to • 
the people. 
The test for determining whether "laws of 
a general nature . . . have uniform applica-
tion" is twofold. "First, a law must apply 
equally to all persons within a class. Second, 
the statutory classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency 
to further the objectives of the statute." Id. 
at 670 (citations omitted). 'Whether a law 
operates uniformly under Article I, section 
24 is a judicial question. 
f 
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S e c 1& ^Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
Sec 10. (Powers denied the states.} 
(1.1 No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or confederation; grant letters of marque and repri-
*al; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing 
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; 
pass any bill of attainder, jn Pft^ f f l g tn i a w r o r **w 
impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any 
title of nobility. 
(2.1 No State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Ex-
ports, except what may- be absolutely necessary for 
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of 
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports 
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the 
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to 
the Revision and Control of the Congress. 
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships 
of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, 
or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger asvw^ii not admit of delay. 
Jid^umd^ iMk&9w%i&£& &L 
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I BETTER GET MY ALLEGATIONS. YOU HEARD FROM THE COURT 
CLERK, THE FIRST COUNT IN THIS CASE IS CALLED AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPPING. SOME PEOPLE HAVE A THOUGHT IN THEIR MIND AS TO 
WHAT KIDNAPPING MIGHT BE. SOME OF US ARE OLD ENOUGH TO 
REMEMBER THE LINDBURGJCIDNAPPING, FOR EXAMPLE. I'M GOING TO 
TELL YOU THAT IN A KIDNAPPING, IN AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A 
VICTIM NEED NOT BE RESTRAINED FOR ANY PERIOD OF TIME. THERE 
IS NO MINIMUM PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 
TAKES PLACE. DO ANY OF YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THAT CONCEPT? 
OKAY. I ASSUME BY THE FACT THAT NOBODY HAS RAISED HIS OR 
HER HAND THAT THERE IS NOT A PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
S mty "lip0®*}BtokMrfh9fin. ^  Mmjtf m£kzkJkL 
S^mm^&m^^mWi^ 
A -CrrtifAzterzr )[&£&{£&{*$*'"*?*h* 
J & ^^^^/Cflff^f 4ifMk4&'*»lte&A i/.*.e r/ «m/J* 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of convic-
tion of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
, credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the ac-
cused has been convicted of a crime shall be ad-
mitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which the witness 
~~ was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted 
_^  if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
MM^f^M^flm^^^MB mf9tbdt^dkugs^a& 
-tJjUZMUQ.* Rule
 9 . Grounds for discipline. 
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
( a )
 violate the Rules of Professional Conduct 
or any other rules of this jurisdiction regarding 
professional conduct of lawyers; 
^SAmm^^^^J^J^-^ ..._ 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
James Devon LANIER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880101. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 31, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
- District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard 
H. Moffat, J., of aggravated robbery, and 
_ he appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, 
J., held that error in ruling that defen-
tidns were admissfl>le for impeachment pu t 
Reversed and remanded 
•Jm*^ tfTrr/mvtoft-^Auog- Aifc **-*ir&ntoMfatr} v/Mim ZfaiMt 
.£§» Sf&a&S 7WL^stiMam4nsto/dfa4£i?? %-J<ufL %KL 
«*/agg^A= 
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76-5-302.- Aggravated kidnapuig-
\l) A person commits aggravatea Kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law and against the wiii of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, 
or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield 
"orliostage. or to compel a third person to engage 
in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging 
in particular conduct: or 
(b> To facilitate the commission, attempted 
~«3-fffifg2?flffT 
commission, or flight after commission or at-
tempted commission of a felony: or 
- ?<M Tn inflict bodily injury on or to terronze the 
victim or another, or 
J\> interfere with the performance of any 
governmental or political function: or 
le» To commit a sexuai offense as described in 
Part 4 of this chaoter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the re-
sult of force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally 
incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the ef-
fective consent of the victim's custodial parent, 
?uardian» or person acting in loco parentis to the vic-
tim. 
BURDEN OF PROOF j U ^ 
"Ele-76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — 
ment of the offense" defined. 
(DA defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
of the of-
vond a reason-
sumed to be innocent until each element 
fense charged against him is proved De ?
'able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
"be acauitt ' ^ 
i^teAlfamt-
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. lm 
tepvUmmM. 
jfatfr. 
SkuJ^dhk^ticaLs^ Om) ..._ 
< f i y K wffa/MkP2M,!£Mc Ct*4$)-
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"Generally, ._a person has constructive 
possession of narcotics if he knowingly has ownership, dominion or 
- -4 1 T ? j — -
control over the narcotics and the premises where the narcotxcs 
are found." United States v. Haaer. 969 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 
jjr, ^ mm M £m&£ &&£ &$£ 
S.Jb&cfiditt^fatf^ 
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76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Ele-
ment of the offense" defined. 
(DA defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
sumed to be innocent until each element of the of-
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
r (h) The culpable mental state rpnuir**^ — 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and1 venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by 
preponderance of the evidence. Jfr < ^ " " ~ is 
Wt mi &j6w-&6&Bdrf& ~fc &uA 
MML^L^d: MM*ffrifa(k Sfat/mfmt ^maur. 
JjwaAJbiajkvm&j^^ 
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" "A description or dofinlllon of an act necessary to constitute a 
crime docs not make the commission of such acta a crime, unless 
there is a punishment- annexed. Punishment Is aa necessary to 
constitute a crime as dcflnltlon. • • •- ' 
' I t was accordingly held in that case that a statute which 
does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same ques-. 
tion was before the same court again in Matter of Ellsworth, 
6^5 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to 
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in qucs-
tlon. The ordinance in that case, as in the case nt bar, failed 
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it 
Was again held that the ordinance was without force or effect 
' 'YM^rfr»{fMQ"d* ftrudk/mA £%.&*&. ujjt* turn Swim 
__ irffi* Hum 10^ QyljptiV* , ^__ 
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.."It is well, settled, that a party, 
' _ ^
a
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the case, he, nevertheless, could not prevai l , since, in the judg-
ment of this court , his cons t ruc t ion of the s ta tu te is clearly 
untenable . 
There is therefore no mer i t in counsel 's contention, and 
h n i r e the petition for a r e h e a r i n g should be, and it accord-
ingly is, denied. 
C O R F M A N , C. J . , a n d "WEBER, G I D E O N , and T1IUR-
^fAX, J J . , concur. 
M O O R E I I O U S E v. H A M M O N D , Director of Registrat ion. 
No. 3S60. Decided October 4, 1922. (209 Pac. SS3.) 
1. PHYSICIANS ANT> SLROKONS—ORDINANCE REQUIRING GREATER DU-
TIES THAN STATUTE RELATING TO REVOCATION OF PHYSICIAN'S 
LICENSE HELD INVALID. Where Comp. Laws 1017, § 444S, as 
amended by Laws 1921, c. 91, defines the acts or omissions on 
the part of a physician which would authorize the revocation 
of his license, an ordinance, in the absence of statutory author-
ity, cannot impose greater or different duties in that respect.1 
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—ORDINANCE FOR WHICH NO PENALTY 
PHOVIDKD WITHOUT FORCE. Where an ordinance docs not pre-
scribe a penalty for its violation, the courts are powerless to 
enforce it. 
3. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION—FAILURE OF PHYSICIAN TO RETORT 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE "IN WRITING" NOT AN OFFENSE. Where the 
complaint alleged that accused, a physician, in violation of an 
ordinance, willfully failed to report in writing a case of in-
fectious disease, defendant could not be convicted under Comp. 
Laws 1017, § 444S, as amended by Laws 1921, c. 91. merely re-
quiring a physician to rei>ort the existence of such a case. 
Original application for a w r i t of cer t iorar i by Charles V. 
Moorehouse to be directed to J a m e s T. Hammond , Director 
of Registrat ion. 
W R I T ISSUED. 
i Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 Utah, 59G. 
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A, W. Agce, of Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Harvey JJ. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for defendant. 
PRICK, J. 
On August 30, 1922, the plaintiff made application in due 
form to this court for a writ of certiorari to be directed to 
the defendant as director of registration requiring the latter 
to certify up the proceedings in a certain matter in which the 
defendant, as director of registration, made and entered an 
order in which he revoked and annulled the license thereto-
fore granted and issued to the plaintiff to practice medicine 
and surgery in this state, which order the plaintiff alleged to 
be in excess of the defendant's jurisdiction, and for that rea-
son should be set aside. The writ was duly issued and 
served upon the defendant, and in compliance therewith he 
has certified the record of the proceedings had before him in 
the matter aforesaid to this court. 
Upon the record being certified to this court the plaintiff 
moved for judgment in his favor upon the proceedings certi-
fied as aforesaid. The cause was duly argued and submitted 
to this court by counsel for the respective parties upon the 
motion aforesaid. 
From the record of the proceedings had before the defend-
ant it appears that a complaint in writing was duly filed in 
the office of the defendant as director of registration, in which 
it was charged that the plaintiff— 
"while practicing under Paid license, haa been guilty of 'unprofes-
sional conduct* • * • In the following particulars: That tho 
said Chas. V. Moorehouse willfully failed to report in writing to 
the health officer the existence of a case of infectious disease which *• 
he was treating at Junction, Piute county, on the 14th day of Feb-
ruary, 1920. In further support of this allegation the complainant 
alleges that a complaint waB made before the justice of tho peace 
of the town of Junction, In Piute county, state of Utah, charging 
him with the said offense, and that he, the said Chas. V. Moore-
house, was duly arrested under a warrant issued on tho said com-
Al ipt and brought into court on tho 31st day of March, 1920, and 
MA 
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he then and there pleaded guilty to the said charge and was ad-
judged guilty by the court and ordered to pay a fine of $25. The 
complainant therefore requests that.a citation be issued requiring 
the said defendant to show why his license to practice medicine and 
surgery should not be revoked." 
Upon the foregoing complaint a hearing was had before the 
defendant and a committee of physicians, as provided by our 
statute. The committee, after hearing the evidence, made 
their report or recommendation to the defendant in the fol-
lowing words: 
"We, the committee designated by tho director for that purpose, 
report that we have heard the evidenco submitted in the proceed-
ings in this department to revoke the license of Charles V. Moore-
house, and from such evidence we And that the said Charles V. 
Moorehouse is guilty of unprofessional conduct as charged in the 
complaint filed herein, and we recommend that his license to prac-
tice medicine and surgery be revoked by the department " 
The defendant, in pursuance of such recommendation, en-
tered the following order: 
"Under tho findings and recommendation of the corr.mittee and 
under the provisions of the statute It is hereby ordered that the 
license to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah Issued 
to Dr. Charles V. Moorehouse on the 6th day of July, Kll , by tho 
State Board of Medical Examiners and numbered 6S&, t-.\ and the 
same Is hereby, revoked and canceled." 
Considerable evidence was produced at the hearing before 
the defendant, which it is not necessary to set forth. We 
shall, however, in the course of this opinion, refer to such 
portions thereof as are deemed material. 
From the original complaint filed against the plaintiff lie-
fore the defendant it is made to appear that the plaintiff 
had been charged with the same offense before a justice of 
the peace and had pleaded guilty to such charge, and. in pur-
suance of such plea, the justice adjudged that he pay a fine 
of $25. The judgment of conviction entered in such justice's 
court was produced before the defendant and said committee 
as evidence that the plaintiff had been charged in said jus-
tice's court with the offense of unprofessional conduct, and 
that by entering a pica of guilty he had confessed or admit fed 
his guilt. 
59G SUPREME COURT OP UTAH [Sept. 
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It will be observed that the real charge preferred against 
the plaintiff both in the justice's court and before the defend-
ant is that he had "willfully failed to report in writing to 
the health officer/' etc. In view that the plaintiff was 
charged with the violation of a certain ordinance, it becomes 
important to consider the language of the same. The ordi-
nance reads as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of every physician In this town to report to 
the president, In writing, every person who Is affected with any 
contagious or infectious disease, such as cholera, diphtheria, yellow 
fover, scarlet fever, typhoid fever, whooping cough, measles, mumps, 
smallpox, varioloid, or any of the grades of such diseases Immedi-
ately after he shall be satisfied of the nature of the disease, and to 
report to tho same officer every case of duath from any of said dis-
eases Immediately after It occurs." 
In this connection it also becomes important to keep in 
mind our statute upon which the aforesaid ordinance was 
predicated and upon which the defendant relies to sustain 
his order revoking plaintiff's license to practice medicine and 
surgery in this state. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 4448, as 
amended by chapter 91, Laws Utah 1921, so far as material 
here, defines what shall constitute "unprofessional conduct" 
authorizing the revocation of a physician's license as follows: 
"Willful violation of the law In regard to the registration of 
births and deaths and the reporting of infectious diseases." 
In another section (272G) the duty imposed upon physi-
cians and surgeons respecting contagious diseases is stated 
thus: 
"All physicians and other persons having Knowledge of the ex-
istence of any contagions or infectious disease, or having reason to 
believe that any such disease exists, are hereby required to repori 
the same forthwith to the local board of health." 
It will thus be seen that, while the statute merely requires 
a physician to report " the existence of any contagious or in-
fectious diseases * • # to the local board of health," the 
ordinance to which reference has been made, and which was 
the basis of the charge against the plaintiff both before the 
justice of the peace and the defendant, required that a report 
be made " in writing." The ordinance therefore required 
£ g from the physician than did the statute. While the 
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cities and towns, including boards of health, in this slate are 
given ample power to pass and enforce ordinances and to 
promulgate and enforce rules and regulations respecting' the 
public health and to require certain things to be done in case 
of contagious and infectious diseases, yet where, as here, the 
statute specifically defines what act or acts of commission or 
omission on the part of a physician shall constitute 
"unprofessional conduct" authorizing the revocation 1 
of his license to practice medicine, an ordinance, in the 
absence of express statutory authority, cannot impose greater 
or different duties in that regard than the statute imposes. 
This court, in Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 Utah, 5.%, 1:1-1 Pac. 
558, held that, where the statute merely authorized the im-
position of a fine for a particular offense, an ordinance might 
not impose a fine and imprisonment as punishment for the 
same offense, but must be restricted to the penalty authorized 
by statute. 
However, if it were held that the ordinance in question here 
and upon which the charge against the plaintiff was predi-
cated could impose the duty of reporting contagious anil in-
fectious diseases in writing, yet the ordinance, for other rea-
sons, is wholly without force or effect. 13y reference to the 
ordinance it will be seen that it does not declare a refusal or 
omission to make a report unlawful; nor does it impose any 
penalty or punishment for such refusal or omission. The 
ordinance therefore merely amounts to a direction to the 
physician :o make a report. In view that it does not de-
nounce the omission or failure to report as unlawful 
nor impose any penalty or punishment for a failure 2 
to make a report the ordinance is clearly unenforce-
able. The imposition of the fine by the justice was therefore 
clearly beyond his power and constituted manifest usurpation. 
Courts cannot impose penalties unless authorized by stat-
ute. Neither can they impose other or different penalties 
than those authorized by statute. The courts have had fre-
quent occasion to pass upon such matters. The Supreme 
Court of California, in People v. McNuIty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 
Pae. 5!)7, states the law thus: J L ^ 
i * awwiwa&E twipmiu///-H-fi=i 
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"A description or definition of an act necessary to constitute a 
crime does not make the commission of such acts a crime, unless 
thore is a punishment' annexed. Punishment is as necessary to 
constitute a crime as definition. • • •" 
It was accordingly held in that case that a statute which 
does not impose a penalty is unenforceable. The same ques-
tion was before the same court again in Matter of Ellsworth, 
165 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272, where an ordinance relating to 
the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors was in ques-
tion. The ordinance in that case, as in the case at bar, failed 
to impose any penalty or punishment for its violation, and it 
was again held that the ordinance was without force or effect. 
In NLW Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. 652, 69 South. 43, the de-
fendant was convicted of violating tho provisions of a certain 
ordinance relating to the public health. The defendant ap-
pealed from the conviction, contending that, in view that tho 
ordinance under which he was convicted failed to impose a 
penalty or punishment, the sentence imposed by the court 
was illegal and \oid. The court sustained the contention. 
The law is clearly stated m the headnote as follows: 
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses except such as are 
created by statute or ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose 
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hence a 
statute or ordinance making it a crime or offense to do a certain 
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inop-
erative, and incapable of being given any effect by the courts." 
The same question was before the Supreme Couit of Flor-
ida in the case of Cnbb v. State, 9 Fla., where, at page 418, 
after referring to the statute under which the con\iction was 
had, tho court said: 
"But the difficulty of sustaining the conviction and judgment 
under this count is that, although it [the statute] enjoins or forbids 
the resident from holding the license, no penalty or remedy by in-
dictment Is prescribed. • • • The statute that creates the of-
fense has not prescribed the penulty." 
It was accordingly held that the judgment of comictiou 
was illegal It is not neeessan to pursue the question or the 
authorities further. It must be manifest to every lawyer that 
crimes can only be created by the Legislature or by its express 
llphority, and that, unless a criminal statute or ordinance 
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prescribes a penalty for its violation, the courts are power-
less to enforce the same. The judgment of the justice's court, 
which was produced in evidence at the hearing before the de-
fendant and the committee of physicians, was therefore with-
out force or effect, and the recommendation or report of the 
physicians to the defendant, being based thereon, was like-
wise without any legal force or effect In view, therefore, 
that the recommendation or report of the physicians fails, it 
follows as a necessary corollary that the order of the defend-
ant based thereon revoking the license of the physician must 
likewise fail and must be held without legal force or effect. 
It is contended by counsel for the defendant, however, that 
although the conviction under the ordinance fails, the order 
of the defendant revoking the plaintiff's license should never-
theless be upheld for the reason that the plaintiff has failed 
to comply with the provisions of the statute in that he failed 
to make a report "to the local board of health." The record 
of the proceedings certified up shows that a member of the 
boaid of trustees of the town in which plaintiff practiced, who 
was a witness at the hearing, testified that he was the author-
ized quarantine officer of the town aforesaid; that he was 
present at the house of the afflicted person, and that the 
plaintiff informed the witness as the quarantine officer of the 
town and a member of the board of trustees that the patient 
was afflicted with small pox; that immediately upon recehing 
such information the witness put up a sign quarantining the 
house in whiqh the patient was confined. There is neither dis-
pute nor conflict respecting the facta thus testified to by the 
witness aforesaid. No doubt the principal purpose of the 
statute requiring that a report of contagious and infectious 
diseases be forthwith made to the local boards of health is 
that the afflicted person may be properly quarantined and the 
public warned so that contact with the diseased person may 
be avoided and the spread of the contagion or infection pre-
vented. All this was clearly accomplished in this case by 
plaintiff's report to the member of the town board who was 
the quarantine officer, and whose duty it was to act, \|^  '£ 
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he did by quarantining the house in which the afflicted person 
was. 
But, quite apart from all this, what the plaintiff in fact 
was charged with was that lie had '* willfully failed to report 
in writing to the health officer the existence of a case of in-
fectious disease, which he was treating," etc. The statute 
does not require a report in writing, but merely requires that 
a report be made. We have already pointed out that the 
evidence is without conflict that a report was in fact 
made to a member of the town board who was then 3 
quarantine officer. The provisions of the statute were 
thus substantially complied with, and that is all that the law 
requires. Under our system of jurisprudence the penalties 
prescribed in criminal statutes can be imposed and the priv-
ileges of the accused can be forfeited only in cases where it 
is clear that the provisions of the law have been violated. 
Courts cannot add terms or conditions, much less impose 
penalties not expressly authorized by the statute. Nor can 
an accused person be convicted of an offense other than the 
one stated in the complaint filed against him. In view, there-
fore, that in this case it appears that the plaintiff was charged 
with having failed to report in writing, he cannot be convicted 
unless he failed to so report. Moreover, inasmuch as the 
statute required him to report the existence of the disease 
only, and the evidence being conclusive that he did report 
the same to the quarantine officer, who was also a member of 
the town board, and that the patient was quarantined and 
the principal purposes of the statute thus accomplished, the 
order revoking the license finds no support in the law, and 
therefore cannot be permitted to stand. 
In concluding this opinion we desire to add that we arc 
very reluctant to interfere with the orders of the boards of 
health in carrying into effect the rules, regulations, and ordi-
nances relating to the prevention of disease and the protection 
of the public health. In enforcing such rules, regulations, 
and ordinances the boards of health are exercising the high-
est functions of government, and they should not be inter-
fered with unless it is clear that they have exceeded the 
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bounds of their authority. Where, however, as here, the 
rights of a citizen have been invaded and lie lias been con-
demned without authority of law and has had his license 
to practice his profession revoked, we have no alternative 
save to correct the wrong by annulling and setting aside the 
order by which his privileges have been denied him. It is 
therefore ordered that the order of the director of registra-
tion, the defendant herein, by which the license of the plain-
tiff was attempted to be revoked and annulled be, and the 
same is hereby, vacated and set aside and the license of the 
plaintiff is reinstated and adjudged to be in full force and 
effect until revoked in accordance with law. 
It appearing to this court, however, in acting as a public 
official, that the defendant proceeded in good faith in making 
the order aforesaid, neither party is allowed costs. 
COItFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON, and THUR-
MAN, JJ . , concur. 
BANKERS' COMMERCIAL SECURITY CO. v. DISTRICT 
COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY. 
No. 3S3C. Decided October 4, 1922. Rehearing denied January 3, 
1923. (211 Pac. 1S7.) 
1. MANDAMUS—Ox DEMURRER, ALLEGATIONS OF PETTITION MTST BE 
ACCEPTED AS TBUE. In mandamus proceedings, where defend-
ant lias demurred to the petition and the matter is submitted 
on that state of the record, the allegations of tho petition must 
bo accepted as true. 
2. MANDAMUS—€OUBT WILL NOT BE COEBCED UNLESS RIGHT or Ao-
GBIEVED PARTY FREE FROM DOUBT AND DUTY OF COURT CLEAR. On 
mandamus proceedings directed against a court, the court will 
not be coerced to act, unless tho right of the aggrieved party is 
free from doubt and the duty of the court clear and free from 
* substantial question.! 
>Kvrimcs v. Kyrimt, 45 Utah. Ififi. i « «... o 
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not delegate responsibility to independent contractor and 
latter^ admissions as to physical facts evidence against de-
fendant) ; Nos. 8 to 23, inclusive, 26 to 31, inclusive, 34 to 
41, inclusive (42 and 43 as aids), 44 to 46 and 49 to 55, in-
clusive, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63 (double question—calls for a con-
clusion), 64 to 75, inclusive (the latter as to agreement in 
reference to angle irons), 76, 78, 80 (no evidence to sup-
port), 81, 83, 84, 86 (except as to fronts or lines theory of 
damages incorrect), 87, 88, 89, 90 (because of finding of 
acquiescence), 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 99, (101 to 104, inclusive, 
should all be encompassed in 105), 107, 108. Respondent's 
assignments Nos. 1 and 2 (on ground of improper mode of 
assessing damages), 3 (but not on ground mentioned). Not 
well taken: Nos. 24, 25, 32, 33, 47, 48 (to show knowledge), 
56, 58, 60, 77, 79, 82, 85, 93 (conflict of evidence), 95 (con-
flict in evidence), 98 (conflict in evidence), 100 (conflict in 
evidence), 106. Question assigned as error in No. 60 was 
abandoned. Respondent's assignments Nos. 4, 5, and 6. 
The judgment is reversed, with directions to grant a new 
trial in accordance with the principles herein announced. 
Costs to appellant. 
ELIAS HANSEN, C. J., FOLLAND and EPHRAIM 
HANSON, JJ., and H. M. SCHILLER, District Judge, con-
cur. 
MOFFAT, J., being disqualified, did not participate here-
in. 
ROE et al. v. LUNDSTROM et al. 
No. 5622. Decided May 11, 1936. (57 P. [2d] 1128.) 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR, Appeal held not subject to dismissal on 
ground that appeal was not taken in time in that it was not taken 
within six months from date when court rendered decision, where 
appeal was taken within six months from date of filing of find-
ings, conclusions, and judgment (Rev. St. 1933, 104-31-2). 
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2. APPEAL AND ERROR. Bill of exceptions would not be stricken on 
ground that it was not prepared and served in time, where no 
notice of entry of judgment was given, and time in which to pre-
pare and serve bill of exceptions was extended for two months 
on date when appeal was taken, and proposed bill was served 
within that time (Rev. St. Utah 1933, 104-39-4 (2). 
8. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignment of error in overruling plain-
tiffs' demurrer would be considered as abandoned where not 
argued. 
4. APPEAL AND ERROR. In action for damages for unlawful and 
malicious interference with plaintiffs' business, overruling of 
special demurrer to defendants' answer held not reversible error 
in view of conclusion reached on appeal that defendants would be 
liable as joint tort-feasors (Rev. St. 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-G5, 
15-G-G6,15-7-64, 16-9-9, 15-9-21, 105-3-1). 
6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Municipal ordinance failing to fix 
penalty for violation thereof is unenforceable.1 
6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. City commissioners and police officers 
of city held without power to prevent violation of ordinance which 
failed to fix penalty for its violation. 
7. ARREST. Police officer is protected only when armed with a war-
rant except in emergencies where prohibited offense or breach of 
peace is committed or threatened 
8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Police officer preventing customers 
from entering place of business which had refused to pay license 
fee required by ordinance for person to engage in business as 
transient merchant held guilty of trespass so as to be liable to 
owner of business, in absence of exigency contemplated by statute 
to justify preventive measures (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-66, 105-3-1). 
9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Generally, municipal officer is immune 
from liability in private suit for his acts in discharging corporate 
duties in absence of willful negligence, malice, or corruption 
constituting misfeasance (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 
15-7-2, 15-7-64). 
10. OFFICERS. Public officer vested with discretionary ministerial 
power and acting within scope of his authority is not liable in 
damages for error in judgment unless guilty of corruption or will-
ful violation of law, but may not claim immunity for commission 
*Moorehou«c V. Hammond, GO Utah 593. 209 P. RR.T 
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of act entirely outside scope of his official duties (Rev. S t 1933, 
1&-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 15-7-2, 15-7-64). * 
11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. In exercise of power to see that ordi-
nances arc faithfully executed, city commissioners would be re-
quired to act as board and not informally and independently as 
individuals, and informal personal interference by commissioners 
with operation of police department or directions to its officers 
would bo unauthorized (Rev. S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 
15-7-2, 15-7-64, 15-9-9, 15-9-21). 
12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Police officer is responsible only to 
head of his department to whom has been given power of his 
appointment and removal from office (Rev. St. 1933, 15-9-9, 
15-9-21). 
13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. City commissioners directing:, en-
couraging, advising, and co-operating with police officer in com-
mission of trespass by excluding customers from place of business 
of persons who refused to pay tax imposed by ordinance on 
transient businesses held jointly liable with police officer for tres-
pass, irrespective of good faith on part of police officer (Rev. 
S t 1933, 15-6-5, 15-6-13, 15-6-65, 15-6-66, 15-7-2, 15-7-64, 15-9-9, 
15-9-21, 105-3-1). 
14. TRESPASS. Motive of trespasser is not material element to be con-
sidered in determining whether or not legal right has been in-
vaded, although motive may be material where conduct is of such 
character as to be qualifiedly privileged, or as involving right to 
recover punitive damages. 
Appeal from District Court, First District, Cache Coun-
ty; Oscar W. McConkie, Judge. 
Action by H. H. Roe and another against A. G. Lundstrom 
and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
Henry D. Moyle, of Salt Lake City, and George D. Pres~ 
ton, of Logan, for appellants. 
Leoii Fo-nnesbeck, of Logan, for respondents. 
*Lousry v. Carbon Count]/, CA Utah 555, 232 P. 008. 
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EVANS, District Judge. 
This is an action in tort to recover damages for an alleged 
unlawful and malicious interference with plaintiffs' busi-
ness. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants Lundstrom, 
Merkeley, and Pederson, as city commissioners of Logan 
City, through Smith, a police officer, prevented the public 
from entering the plaintiffs' place of business where the 
plaintiffs proposed to conduct a sale of seasonable merchan-
dise recently purchased by them in receivership proceedings, 
and for which interference they seek actual and punitive 
damages. 
The defendants seek to justify their conduct by setting 
up a failure on the part of the plaintiffs to procure a license 
as required by the ordinances of Logan City. 
The defendants move to dismiss the appeal upon the 
ground that it was not taken in time. It is contended that 
the appeal should have been taken within six months from 
the time when the court rendered its decision, January 
27, 1934. Findings, conclusions, and judgment were 1 
filed and entered on February 15, 1934. The appeal , 
was taken on August 10, 1934. The motion to dismiss the 
appeal is accordingly denied. R. S. Utah 1933, 104-41-2. 
Defendants move to strike the bill of exceptions upon the 
ground that it was not prepared and served in time. No 
notice of the entry of judgment was given. On August 10, 
1934, the time in which to prepare and serve the bill 
of exceptions was extended to October 10, 1934. The 2 
proposed bill was served on the 14th day of Septem-
ber, 1934. The motion to strike the bill of exceptions is, 
therefore, denied. R. S. Utah 1933, 104-39-4, subd. 2. 
The plaintiffs demurred generally to the answer and as-
sign error in overruling the demurrer. This assignment, 
not being argued, is abandoned. They also interposed 
a special demurrer, upon the overruling of which 3, 4 
error is assigned and argued in the brief. In view of 
the conclusions reached by us, the overruling of the .special 
demurrer does not constitute reversible error. 
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The defense alleged is that the plaintiffs were not licensed 
to do business, as required by the ordinances of Logan City; 
that the interference complained of was in good faith to pre-
vent a violation of law. In reply, plaintiffs allege that prior 
to advertising the fact that they were going to conduct a 
sale of merchandise, they tendered to the city clerk the fee 
required for carrying on a merchandising business, which 
tender was refused by the clerk. The plaintiffs did not deny 
that they proposed to conduct their business without a 
license, but claim that they had nevertheless qualified by fil-
ing an application and tendering the required fee for doing 
business as merchants. They contend that the ordinance 
defining transient merchants is void. 
The essential facts as disclosed by the record are substan-
tially as follows: One W. F. Mau, operating a business under 
the name of Mau's Department Store, made an assignment 
for the benefit of creditors. Plaintiffs ultimately acquired 
the stock of merchandise so assigned, and announced by 
advertisements that they intended to conduct a sale to open 
on July 16th and continue for seven days, to dispose of the 
entire stock and fixtures. On the 16th day of July, the day 
set for the opening, the sum of $8.25 was tendered as a 
license fee, together with an application for a retail mer-
chant's license. The tender was refused and the application 
denied, notwithstanding which the plaintiffs announced that 
they would proceed to conduct the sale as advertised. Act-
ing under instructions from the defendant commissioners, 
the chief of police posted the defendant Smith at the en-
trance of the store to prevent the plaintiffs from conducting 
the sale. An ordinance of Logan City provides that it shall 
be unlawful for any person to engage in business as a trans-
sient merchant without first obtaining a license, the fee for 
which is fixed at $25 per day. No penalty is provided for 
its violation, nor any procedure for its enforcement. 
The trial court found that the ordinance defining transient 
merchants, the validity of which was challenged by the 
plaintiffs, was in full force and effect Upon this finding 
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the appellants assign error. The provision requiring 
the payment of $25 per day would not necessarily 5-8 
render the entire ordinance invalid. In appropriate 
proceedings, the fee required to be paid might be held to be 
discriminatory. It is however, in view of the conclusion 
reached, unnecessary to determine this question. In order 
that the ordinance may be valid, for the purpose of insti-
tuting a criminal proceeding, the procedure for its enforce-
ment should be provided. It is not sufficient merely to de-
clare an act unlawful. If the ordinance fails to fix a penalty 
for its violation, it is unenforceable. This principle is aptly 
stated in the case of Moorehouse v. Hammond, 60 Utah 593, 
209 P. 883,885: 
"There are in this state no crimes or offenses, except such as are 
created by statute or ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose a 
penalty not prescribed by a statute or an ordinance; and hence a 
statute or ordinance making it a crime or offense to do a certain act, 
without attaching a penalty to the doing of such act, is inoperative, 
and incapable of being given any effect by the courts." 
If then the courts are without power to enforce an ordi-
nance, it necessarily follows that the defendants would be 
powerless to prevent its violation, but even though the ordi-
nance were valid and enforceable, there still remains the 
question as to whether or not the offense of selling without 
a license is one which may be prevented. R. S. Utah 1933, 
105-3-1, provides that: 
"Public offenses may be prevented by the intervention of the offi-
cers of justice: (1) By requiring security to keep the peace. (2) By 
forming B, police in cities, towns or counties, and by requiring their 
attendance in exposed places. (3) By suppressing riots." 
Here there existed no exigency such as is contemplated 
by the statute to require or justify preventive measures. 
Peace officers no longer stand as the symbol and embodi-
ment of the law, except in film, fiction, and the lands of 
traffic. Except in emergencies where a prohibited offense 
or breach of the peace is committed or threatened, a police 
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officer is protected only when armed with a warrant. In 
this case there was neither a warrant nor an arrest. The 
power conferred upon police officers to "preserve the pub-
lic peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders," etc. 
(R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-66), was not regularly pursued. I t 
is impossible to escape the conclusion that officer Smith was 
guilty of a trespass. 
With respect to the liability of the defendant commis-
sioners, the situation is different and not altogether clear. 
They allege in their separate answers that they advised the 
plaintiffs that if they did not desire to take out an auction-
eer's license, that they would be deemed to be transient 
merchants and would be required to pay the license as re-
quired by the ordinance relating to transient merchants. 
They deny, among other things, that Smith was their em-
ployee or agent or that they directed him to prohibit persons 
from entering plaintiffs' building. Lundstrom testified 
that he instructed the city marshal to have the ordinance 
complied with; that he intended the marshal to post a police-
man, who was kept all day upon the plaintiffs' premises with 
his consent and approval; that the marshal could not have 
carried out his orders in any other way; and that the police-
man had done only what he had ordered him to do. It does 
not appear that either Merkeley or Pederson gave any di-
rections to the chief of police, but it was stipulated that 
whatever the officer did was directed by the chief of police, 
who was directed by the commissioners and in pursuance of 
their orders. 
It is pertinent to inquire by what right the defendant 
commissioners assumed to give directions as to the enforce-
ment of an ordinance, or as to the method of its enforcement. 
The statute provides that all actions brought to recover any 
fine or to enforce any penalty under an ordinance of a city 
or town shall be brought in the corporate name of the city 
or town as plaintiff. R. S. Utah 1933,15-7-64. It is further 
provided that when power is conferred upon the board of 
commissioners to perform any act and the method of exercis-
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ing such power is not specifically pointed out, the board of 
commissioners may provide by ordinance the manner and 
details necessary for the full exercise of such powers. R. 
S. Utah 1933, 15-7-2. It is further provided that the chief 
of police shall enforce all ordinances and regulations of the 
city for the preservation of peace, good order, and the pro-
tection of the rights and property of all persons. R. S. Utah 
1933,15-6-65. Such powers as are conferred upon city Com-
missioners must be exercised through formal motion, resolu-
tion, or ordinance which must be reduced to writing and 
read before a vote is taken thereon, and no act of the board 
shall be valid or binding unless two members concur therein. 
R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-13. The boards of commissioners are 
legislative and governing bodies. R. S. Utah 1933, 15-6-5. 
Executive and administrative powers in cities of the first 
and second class are distributed among five departments, 
each of which is assigned to one of the commissioners. 
If tJie defendant commissioners are to be charged with 
liability, it must be upon the theory that they are joint tort-
feasors. It is a general rule that a municipal officer is im-
mune from liability in a private suit for his acts in 
the discharge of corporate duties in the absence of 9, 10 
willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting 
misfeasance. Smith V. Steplian, 66 Md. 381, 7 A. 561, 10 A. 
671; Worley V. Inhabitants of Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; Rocrig 
v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231,175 N. W. 542; 2 Cooley on Torts 
(4th Ed.) § 300 et seq.; 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corpora-
tions (2d Ed.) § 556, and it is often asserted that where a 
public officer is by law vested with discretionary ministerial 
powers, and acts within the scope of his authority, he is not 
liable in damages for an error in judgment unless guilty of 
corruption or willful violation of the law. He may not, 
however, claim immunity for the commission of an act en-
tirely outside of the scope of his official duties. Lowry v. 
Carbon County, 64 Utah 555, 232 P. 908; Mock V. Santa Rosa, 
126 Cal. 330, 58 P. 826; Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 393, 26 S. 
E. 847, 64 Am. S t Rep. 737; Burch V. Hardwicke, 30 Grafc. 
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(71 Va,) 24, 32 Am. Rep. 640; Craig V. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; 
2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 556. 
Now let us assume that the defendant commissioners are 
charged with the duty of seeing that the ordinances are 
faithfully executed. In the exercise of this power, they 
would necessarily have to act as a board and not in-
formally and independently as individuals. If we are 11,12 
to give effect to the provision that when power is con-
ferred upon the board of commissioners to perform any act, 
they may provide by ordinance the manner and details neces-
sary to the full exercise of such powers, then any informal 
personal interference with the operation of the police de-
partment or any directions to its officers would appear to 
be wholly unjustified and entirely beyond the powers con-
ferred upon the board, or upon the individual commissioners, 
as such, except possibly the commissioner of public safety. 
The duties of police officers are very definitely prescribed 
and fixed by law. A police officer is responsible only to the 
head of his department, to whom has been given the power 
of his appointment and removal from office. R. S. Utah 
1933, 15-9-9 and 15-9-21. 
Whether we view this case as one in which the commis-
sioners acted beyond the scope of their powers or as a 
failure on their part to regularly pursue powers con- 13,14 
ferred, the result would be the same, for under this 
record the commissioners admittedly directed, encouraged, 
advised, and co-operated in the commission of a trespass and 
hence are liable as joint tort-feasors. 
"AH persons who command, instigate, encourage, advise, counten-
ance, co-operate in, aid or abet the commission of a trespass by an-
other are cotrespassers with the person committing trespass and are 
each liable as principals to the same extent and in the same manner 
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves." 
26 R. C. L. § 15, p. 766-768; Bailey V. Idaho Irrigation Co., 
39 Idaho 354, 227 P. 1055. 
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The law is well settled that those who aid in the commis-
sion of a wrongful act by another are liable for the resulting 
damages, although they expected no benefits from the 
wrongful act and, in fact, received none. Brwmley V. Chat-
tanooga Speedway, etc., Co.f 138 Tenn. 534, 198 S. W. 775. 
Breedlove V. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319; Fchenthal V. Thieben, 23 
111. App. 569; Revert v. Hesse, supra [184 Cal. 295, 193 P. 
943]; Mox, Inc., V. Woods, supra [202 Cal. 675, 262 P. 302.] 
Blair v. Guarantee Title Co., 103 Cal. App. 260, 284 P. 719, 
724; 62 C. J. 1129. 
The plaintiffs allege that Officer Smith was actuated by 
malice. The defendants allege, on the other hand, that what-
ever they did was done in good faith and in the exercise of 
their best judgment as officers in the enforcement of the 
ordinances of Logan City. There is nothing in the record 
which would tend even remotely to justify the inference that 
the defendants were actuated by malice or any improper 
motives. The question of motive may be material in some 
cases as where the conduct is of such a character as to be 
qualifiedly privileged, or as involving the right to recover 
punitive damages. It is not as a general rule a material ele-
ment to be considered in determining whether or not a legal 
right has been invaded. The absence of malice or the pres-
ence of a good motive does not render it any the less a tort. 
Sidney Blumenthal & Co. V. U. S. (C. C. A.) 30 F. (2d) 247; 
Lavender V. Hall, 60 Ala. 214; McCam'oll v. Stafford, 24 Ark. 
224 ; Polar Wave, etc., Co. v. Alton Branch, etc., Society, 155 
III. App. 310; Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 258; 
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 
927, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 702; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 
353, 74 N. E. 603, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 
499, 3 Ann. Cas. 738; Hoehle V. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. 
Super. 21; In re Grout, 88 Vt. 318, 92 A. 646, Ann. Cas. 
1917A, 210; Gebhardt v. Holmes, 149 Wis. 428, 135 N. W. 
860; 62 C.J. 1105. 
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The judgment of the district court is reversed and the 
cause remanded with instructions to grant a new trial, with 
costs to appellants* 
ELIAS HANSEN, C J., and FOLLAND, EPHRAIM 
HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur. 
WOLFE, J., did not participate herein. 
JOHNSON et ux. v. BRINKERHOFF et al. 
Na 5640. Decided Kiy 11, 1936. (57 P. [2d] 1132.) 
1 PLEADING. More liberality will be shown in permitting amend-
ments to pleadings filed before trial than when offered during or 
after trial, where parties may be taken by surprise. 
2. PLEADING. Liberality sbculd be shown in allowance of amend-
ments to pleadings for purpose of permitting complete adjudica-
tion of matters in contrcxiersy and in furtherance of justice.1 
3. PLEADING. Where origirAl complaint in action for damages for 
deprivation of use of w^iar was based on contract with defen-
dants, aUowance of ames.6*d complaint by which plaintiffs claimed 
under deed from comrocz grantor held not reversible error on 
ground that new cause of action was introduced where both plead-
ings related to same subnet-matter, same transaction, and dam-
ages for same wrong (Ear. St. 1933, 104-14-4).J 
4. PLEADING. Trial court LSJ broad discretion in matter of amend-
ments to pleadings (Rer. St. 1933, 104-14-4).* 
5. WATERS AND WATER COOSZS. In action for damages for depriva-
tion of use of water in which plaintiffs relied on deed and de-
fendants on contract, insufficiency of evidence to enable review-
iPeterson v. Union Pac. PL Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P. (2d) 627. 
^Stevens & Wallis v. GoUUx Porphyi-y Mines Co., 81 Utah 414, 18 
P. (2d) 903. 
*Mackay V. Breeze, 72 Ui&i 305, 269 P. 1026; Peterson v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P. (2d) G27; Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 
203, 134 P. 885; Newton v. Trzcy Loan & Trust Co., 88 Utah 547, 40 
P. (2d) 204; Gibson v. EqviizzU Life Assurance Soc, 84 Utah 452, 
36 P. (2d) 105. 
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ing court to determine meaning of contract or whether contract 
and deed should be considered together and failure of judgment 
to dispose of all of water involved required cause to be remanded 
for introduction of additional evidence.4 
6. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignment of error with respect to dam-
ages which merely stated that there was no competent evidence to 
justify decree held insufficient to authorize review.8 
7. ARBITRATION AND AWARD. Statute providing for arbitration of 
disputes existing at time of making of arbitration agreements 
held not to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes (Rev. 
S t 1933, 104-36-1). 
8. CONTRACTS. Where contract relating to water rights provided for 
arbitration of future disagreements, resort to arbitration held not 
condition precedent to right to maintain suit for damages for de-
privation of use of water involved (Rev. St. 1933, 104-36-1). 
Appeal from District Court, Fifth District, Millard Coun-
ty; Dilwortk Woolley, Judge. 
Action by Francis W. Johnson and wife against David A. 
Brinkerhoff and others, wherein John Hansen and wife filed 
a cross-complaint Decree and judgment in favor of plain-
tiffs and cross-complainants, and named defendant appeals. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
D. N. Straup and Willard Hanson, both of Salt Lake City, 
and E. Vance Wilson, of Fillmore, for appellant. 
Sheen & Skeen, of Salt Lake City, for respondents John-
son, 
W. B. Higgins, of Fillmore, for respondents Hansen. 
Sam Cline, of Milford, for respondent State Bank of 
Millard County. 
*Fox Film Corporation V. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P. 
(2d) 294, 90 A. L. R. 1299; Egelund v. Fayter, 51 Utah 579, 172 P. 
313, 10 R. C. L. 1065. 
*Townsend V. llolbrook, 89 Utah 147, 50 P. (2d) G10. 
